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Abstract
It was once commonplace for corporations to make questionable or illegal payments to foreign
government officials, politicians, and political parties as a means of gaining competitive advantage.
In response, Congress passed the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) in 1977 in an effort to
target and punish individuals and corporations that attempt to do business through bribery. In this
article, Frank C. Razzano, a former Assistant U.S. Attorney and former Securities and Exchange
Commission Assistant Chief Trial Attorney, and Travis P. Nelson, a former U.S. Treasury De-
partment Enforcement Counsel, discuss the historical and current trends and efforts by the U.S.
and foreign governments in policing for transnational bribery. With the increased activity and
coordination by and among prosecutors on an international level in the monitoring, investigation,
and prosecution of transuational bribery, corporations must consider the possible investigations and
prosecutions that may be brought both at home and abroad. In addition to discussing the current
legal landscape, the authors also offer important practical insight into preventative measures, in-
cluding the structuring of compliance programs, training of personnel, and responding to allega-
tions of misconduct.
In the mid-i 970's, over 400 American companies admitted making questionable or ille-
gal payments in excess of $300 million to foreign government officials, politicians and
political parties. To make these payments, many of the corporations maintained slush
funds offshore.' Typically, the bribe paying corporation would either capitalize an off-
shore company that did no real business other than serve as a repository for cash bribes, or
it would create phony invoices for goods and services from a fictitious offshore company,
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associate, in the White Collar and Corporate Investigations Practice Group, resident in the Washington, DC
and Philadelphia, PA offices, respectively. Mr. Razzano is a former Assistant United States Attorney for the
District of New Jersey and a former Assistant Chief Trial Attorney with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission. Mr. Nelson is a former attorney in the Enforcement Division of the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency, U.S. Treasury Department.
1. H.R. Rep. No. 95-640, at 4 (Sept. 28, 1977)
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whose invoices it would then pay into offshore bank accounts, making the money available
to make bribe payments.
As a result of these disclosures, Congress enacted the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(FCPA),2 which added section 13(b) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act
or 1934 Act) 3 requiring issuers of publicly traded securities to institute adequate account-
ing controls and to maintain accurate books and records. Congress believed that if public
companies were required to maintain accurate books and records, which accounted for
assets and accurately recorded transactions, slush funds would be eliminated. In addition,
Congress mandated that all issuers, and domestic concerns, defined as citizens, nationals,
and residents of the United States, refrain from making any unlawful payments to foreign
government officials to make decisions or take action, or refrain from taking action, in
order to retain or obtain business. 4
After the passage of the FCPA, American businessmen complained that they operated at
a severe disadvantage because competitors in foreign countries were continuing to make
bribe payments to foreign government officials. In fact, some countries encouraged these
bribe payments by permitting their businessmen to claim a tax deduction for the bribery
payment.5 As a result, the United States did two things. First, it amended the statute in
1988 to focus the act on the nature of the payments rather than solely upon the recipient
and provided for certain affirmative defenses. 6 Additionally, the United States began a
concerted effort to encourage foreign countries to adopt laws similar to the FCPA. In
May of 1994, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's7 Working
Group on bribery approved a treaty regarding bribery in international business transac-
tions, in which member states agreed to take concerted and meaningful action to meet the
goals of deterring, preventing, and combating bribery of foreign officials.
These efforts ultimately culminated in the signing of the OECD Convention on Com-
bating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials and International Business Transactions (the
OECD Convention) in 1997. 8 Under the OECD Convention, members agreed to
criminalize bribery of foreign public officials and officials of public agencies and public
international organizations, to cooperate with each other in this effort by providing mu-
tual assistance in investigations and proceedings, and to make bribery of foreign public
officials an extraditable offense. Additionally, the OECD Convention provides that if a
member's legal system lacks a concept of corporate criminal liability, the member state
would provide for some type of non-criminal sanctions, such as fines. Today thirty-seven
2. The Foreign Corrupt Practice Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, and 78dd-3 (1977) (amended 1998).
3. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b) (2000).
4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78 dd-l-78dd-3 (1977) (amended 1998).
5. See U.S. DEP'T OF JusTICE, PROPOSFD LEGISLATIJVF HISTORY, IN TERNKIIONAL ANTFI-BRIBERTY
Ac oi 1998, http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/history/1998/amends/leghistory.htmnl (last visited
Feb. 3, 2009).
6. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, Title V § 5003(c), 102 Stat.
1419 [hereinafter 1988 Act].
7. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) groups thirty member coun-
tries with a common background of democratic governments and market economies. The organization pro-
vides research and statistics on economic and social issues. See Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development, http://www.oecd.org (last visited Feb. 3, 2009).
8. OECD, Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials and International Business
Transactions, Dec. 18, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1 [hereinafter OECD Convention].
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countries are parties to the OECD Convention, including the thirty members of the
OECD and Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Estonia, Slovenia, and South Africa.9 As a
result of this globalization of anti-bribery laws, there are currently ongoing foreign brib-
ery investigations being conducted all over the world. 10 In Germany alone between June
2006 and June 2007, a total of eighty-eight criminal investigations and prosecutions were
launched resulting in eight guilty verdicts. I I
The internationalization of bribery of foreign government officials gained another
boost when the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption came into force in March
1997, requiring that each member state make transnational bribery of foreign officials a
crime.' 2 The Council of Europe, the European Union, and the African Union have simi-
lar treaties.' 3 On December 14, 2005, the 2003 United Nations Convention Against Cor-
ruption (UNCAC) became effective. 14 In Article 16 of the UNCAC, each state party
agreed to adopt legislation and other measures as may be necessary to outlaw the bribery
of foreign public officials and officials of public international organizations. 15 In article 18
of the UNCAC, each state party also agreed to consider adopting legislation or other
measures that would outlaw trading in influence. 16
Part I of this article will examine the elements of the FCPA as it currently exists in the
United States. Part H will review the vast reach of the FCPA by examining the civil
enforcement actions and criminal prosecutions that United States officials have recently
brought. This article will then compare the American experience with that of other na-
tions that have implemented their own anti-bribery statutes in accordance with their re-
spective treaty obligations. As will be shown, while the United States is still the 800-
9. Angel Gurria, OECD Secretary General, Opening Remarks at the OECD High Level Meeting: The
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention: Its Impact and Its Achievements (Nov. 21, 2007), available at http://www.
oecd.org/dataoecd/41/56/39874084.pdf.
10. See id.
11. See Dr. Matei Hoffmann, Ambassador, German Delegation to the OECD, Statement at the OECD
High Level Meeting: The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention: Its Impact and Its Achievements (Nov. 21,
2007), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/12/48/39867248.pdf. On November 5, 2008, Siemens, AG
announced it was reserving one billion Euros in 2008 "in connection with the settlement being sought by the
company with authorities in Germany and the United States." Press Release, Siemens AG, Siemens Accrues
a Provision in Connection with Ongoing Settlement Negotiations (Nov. 5, 2008), available at http://wl.
siemens.com/press/en/pressrelease/index.php?business% 2Cfinance=& business% 2Cfinance= 1 &trade=0&
vtrade= 1 &public=0&public= I &date- l-dd= 1I &date- 1 -mm=01 &date- 1 =2008&date-2 -dd= I 1 &date-2-mm= 15
&date-2=2008&divisionjreplaced=&division=&search=ongoing+setdement+negotiations.
12. Inter-Arnerican Convention Against Corruption, art. VIII, Mar. 29, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 724 (sought the
elimination of bribery and corruption of government officials). For an English version of the Convention
text, see http://www.oas.org/juridico/English/treaties/b-58.html. For a listing of signatories and ratifications,
see http://www.oas.org/juridico/English/Sigs/b-58.html.
13. Council of Europe, Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, Jan. 27, 1999, 27 I. 1999, available at
http://conventions.coe.intrTreaty/EN/Treaties/Html173.htm. European Union, First Protocol of 1996
(concerning the criminalization of bribery within the EU). European Union Convention on the Fight
Against Corruption Involving Officials of the European Communities or Officials of Member States of the
European Union, May 26, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 195) 1. African Union Convention on Preventing and Com-
bating Corruption, July 11, 2003 available at http://www.africa-union.org/root/AU/DocumentsfFreaties/
Text/Convention% 20on% 20Combating% 20Corruption.pdf.
14. G.A. Res. 58/4, U.N. GAOR, 58th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/Res/58/4, (Nov. 21, 2003) [her-
inafter UNCAC].
15. Id. at art. 16.
16. id. at art. 18.
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pound gorilla in the area, more and more countries are adhering to the principles embod-
ied in the OECD Convention and the UNCAC by implementing legislation outlawing
bribery and actively enforcing those laws. As a result, any person or corporation doing
business abroad must understand these laws and institute effective compliance programs
to stay within the bounds of the law. The final section of this article will suggest that the
only way to avoid the expansive reach and penalties of the FCPA is through an effective
compliance program.
I. The U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
A. ELEMENTS
1. Section 13(h)
The FCPA (a) requires issuers to institute accounting controls and maintain accurate
books and records, and (b) outlaws foreign bribe payments.
Section 13(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which applies to all issuers regis-
tered under sections 12 and 15 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, requires that issu-
ers "make and keep books, records, and accounts, which, in reasonable detail, accurately
and fairly reflect transactions and dispositions of assets" and requires issuers to "devise and
maintain system[s] of internal accounting controls sufficient to provide reasonable assur-
ances that transactions are executed in accordance with management's general or specific
authorization" and that "transactions are recorded as necessary ... to permit preparation
of financial statements in conformity with" GAAP or other applicable criteria.' 7 This
provision further applies to issuers and their subsidiaries, where the issuer owns more than
50 percent of the voting shares of the subsidiary. Where the issuer owns less than 50
percent, it must use its influence to cause the subsidiary to devise and maintain systems of
control consistent with section 13 (b).18
The purpose of section 13(b) was to prevent corporations from creating offshore slush
funds from which to pay bribes and to outlaw the mislabeling or restructuring of transac-
tions in order to conceal foreign bribe payments. An excellent example of how the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission (SEC or the Commission) utilizes this section to combat
foreign bribery is illustrated in SEC v. Con-way, Inc. 19 In that case, Con-way Inc., an
international transportation and logistics service company, owned a U.S. based, wholly
owned subsidiary, Menlow Worldwide Freight, Inc., which had a 55 percent voting inter-
est in Emery Transnational (Emery), a Philippines based firm engaged in shipping and
freight operations in the Philippines.20 Emery made improper payments to induce "for-
eign officials to violate customs regulations, settle customs disputes, and reduce [enforce-
ment of] legitimate fines for administrative violations." 21 In addition, it made "improper
payments to foreign officials at fourteen state-owned airlines that conducted business in
17. 15 U.S.CA § 78m(b)(2)(A)-(B)(ii) (2008).
18. 15 U.S.C.A § 78m(b)(6) (2008).
19. Press Release, SEC, SEC Files Settled Enforcement Action Charging Con-way Inc. with Violations of
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (August 27, 2008), available at http://ftp.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2008/
lr20690.htm [hereinafter Con-way Inc.].
20. Id.
21. Id.
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the Philippines to induce [them] to improperly reserve space for Emery on airplanes, to
falsely under-weigh shipments, and to improperly consolidate multiple shipments ... re-
sulting in lower shipping charges." 22 The SEC issued a cease and desist order enjoining
Con-way, the U.S. parent corporation that only indirectly controlled Emery, from com-
mitting or causing any violations of sections 13(b)(2)(A) and (B) and section 13(b)(5) of the
Exchange Act, based on Con-way's lack of supervision and oversight over Emery, and its
failure to ask for and receive financial information from it.23 Interestingly, the SEC did
not charge Con-way with a violation of section 30A24 on the grounds that it controlled the
subsidiary under section 20 of the Exchange Act.25 Instead, it elected to charge Con-way
with the failure to supervise Emery resulting in a violation of section 13(b).26 Although
not stated in the Commission's press release, this lesser charge may have resulted from
Con-way's cooperation with the Commission's investigation.
2. Securities Exchange Act
The second provision of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act is the anti-bribery sections
contained in section 30A27 of the Exchange Act and sections 10428 and section 105 of the
FCPA.29 These sections provide that issuers, domestic concerns, and persons other than
issuers and domestics concerns, and their officers, directors, employees, agents, and share-
holders, are prohibited from paying, giving, offering, or promising anything of value to a
foreign official, foreign political party, or official thereof, or any candidate for foreign
political office, or any other person "while knowing that all or [any] portion of such
money or thing of value will be offered, given, or promised . . . to any foreign official,...
political party [or official or candidate thereof,] for the purposes of influencing any act or
decision of" any such person in his or her official capacity, including inducing him, her, or
it to act or fail to act in violation of the lawful duty of such office, or securing any im-
proper advantage, or inducing the use of influence with a foreign government or instru-
mentality thereof to affect, or influence any act or decision of such government or
instrumentality, in order to obtain, "or retain business for or with, or directing business
to, any person." 30 Thus, a payment made to a foreign public official for the purpose of
influencing any act or decision of that public official or an omission to act for the purpose
of obtaining and retaining business is outlawed. A payment includes anything of value as
viewed from the defendant's subjective prospective. 3 1
Under section 30A of the Exchange Act, every public company registered with the SEC,
and any foreign companies who have American Depository Receipts (ADRs) traded in the
United States, as well as the officers, directors, agents, employees, and shareholders of
such companies, must abide by the FCPA and are subject to prosecution in the United
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2008).
25. See Con-way Inc., supra note 19.
26. Id.
27. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2008).
28. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2 (2008).
29. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3 (2008).
30. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(a)(1)-(2) (2008).
31. United States v. Williams, 705 F.2d 603 (2nd Cir. 1983).
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States for violating its provisions. The FCPA applies not only to issuers, but also to do-
mestic concerns, which are defined in section 104 as a citizen, national, or resident of the
United States, "or any corporation, partnership, association, or joint-stock company...
organized under the laws of the United States . . . or any political subdivision thereof."32
Under section 105, the United States has asserted jurisdiction over persons other than
issuers and domestic concerns who corruptly make use of the mails or means of interstate
commerce in furtherance of bribery.33 For example, in SEC v. KPMG Siddharta,34 the
United States asserted jurisdiction over KPMG Siddharta, a foreign person, based on is-
suer Baker Hughes' authorizing KPMG Siddharta to make a payment on behalf of a Baker
Hughes foreign subsidiary. KPMG Siddharta's liability was based upon the utilization of
the U.S. mails as a means of interstate or foreign commerce in furtherance of the brib-
ery.35 Thus, the three sections of the FCPA provide for jurisdiction to the fullest extent
permitted by international law.
B. FOREIGN OFFICIAL
The term "foreign official" is defined under the statute to mean "any officer or em-
ployee of a foreign government, or any department, agency or instrumentality thereof, or
of a public international organization, or any person acting in an official capacity for or on
behalf of any such government." 36 Thus, the statute is autonomous in that it defines who
is and is not a foreign official and does not rely for that definition upon the law of the
country where the compromised official resides. It also prohibits payments to foreign
political parties and officials thereof or any candidate for the same purpose. 37
C. CONSULTANTS
Moreover, the statute outlaws payments to any third person, even if they are not public
officials, if the payment is made "knowing that all or a portion . . . will be offered, given,
or promised, directly or indirectly, to any foreign official" 38 for the purpose of influencing
him to act or fail to act. Under the FCPA, "[a] person's state of mind is 'knowing' with
respect to conduct, a circumstance, or a result if (i) such person is aware that such person
is engaging in such conduct, that such circumstance exists, or that such result is substan-
tially certain to occur; or (ii) such person has a firm belief that such circumstance exists or
that such result is substantially certain to occur." 39 "Knowledge is established by aware-
ness of a high probability of the existence of such circumstance unless the person actually
32. 15 U.S.C.§ 78dd-2(i)(2) (2008).
33. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(i)(1); 78dd-3(i)(1) (2008).
34. In re Baker Hughes Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 44784 (September 12, 2001), available at http://
www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-44784.htm.
35. Id.
36. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(h)(2)(A). See Joel M. Cohen, Michael P. Holland & Adam P. Wolf, Under the
FCPA, Who'sa Foreign OfficialAnyway, 63 Bus. LAw. 1243 (2008) (providing an excellent discussion of who is
a foreign instrumentality).
37. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(a)(2) (2008).
38. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a)(3) (2008).
39. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(3)(A) (2008).
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believes that such circumstance does not exist."40 Thus, the term knowing as used in the




The FCPA provides for certain affirmative defenses such as for routine government
actions, which are defined as activities routinely or commonly performed by government
officials such as the "obtaining of permits, licenses, . . . processing governmental papers,
such as visas and work orders, providing police protection, mail pick-up and delivery,
scheduling inspections associated with contract performance or inspections related to
goods transit across country; providing phone service, power and water supply, loading
and unloading goods, or protecting perishable products or commodities from
deterioration."
42
It is also an affirmative defense that the payment is lawful under the written laws and
regulations of the appropriate jurisdiction.43 But this a very limited affirmative defense as
most countries outlaw bribery and under the U.N. Convention on Bribery are required to
pass legislation making bribery unlawful. Moreover, in U.S. v. Kozeny,44 a district court
held that while Azerbaijan local law relieved a bribe payer from criminal liability if the
bribe was properly reported, an affirmative defense was not available because reporting
the offense did not make it legal; it simply negated criminality. In other words, the pay-
ment was unlawful, but the payer was relieved of responsibility.
It is also an affirmative defense that the payment "was a reasonable or bona fide expen-
diture, such as a travel and lodging expenses, incurred by or on behalf of the offi-
cial.. .related to.. .the promotion, demonstration, explanation of products and services; or
the execution, or performance of a contract with a foreign government or agency
thereof."45 This affirmative defense cannot be used as a basis that permits a company to
pay for a foreign official and his family to visit New York, Washington, D.C., Las Vegas,
or Disneyland as part of an inspection visit. It is a limited and narrow exception.
40. 15 U.S.C § 78dd-2(h)(3)(B) (2008). See also Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Joint
Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, HR Rep. No. 100-576, 921 (April 20, 1988) [here-
inafter Joint Statement]. The report states that:
[Tjhe Conferees intend that the knowledge requirement reflect existing law, including provision for cases of
deliberate ignorance. In such cases, knowledge of a fact may be inferred where the defendant has notice of
the high probability of the existence of the fact and has failed to establish an honest, contrary disbelief. The
inference cannot be overcome by the defendant's 'deliberate avoidance of knowledge, United States v.
Manriqie Aribzo, 833 F.2d 244, 249 (10th Cir. 1987), his or her 'willful blindness,' United States v. Kaplan,
832 F.2d 676, 682 (1st Cir. 1987), or his or her 'conscious disregard,' United States v. McAllister, 747 F.2d
1273, 1275 (9th Cir. 1984), of the existence of the required circumstance or result. As such, it covers any
instance where any reasonable person would have realized the existence of the circumstances or result and the
defendant has consciously chose[n] not to ask about what he had reason to believe he would discover, United
States v. Picciandra, 788 F.2d 39, 46 (1st Cir. 1986).
Id.
41. Joint Statement, supra note 40.
42. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(f)(3) and 78dd-2(b) (2008).
43. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(c)(1) (2008).
44. United States v. Kozeny, 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 85443 (S.D.N.Y. October 21, 2008).
45. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(c)(2) (2008).
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It should be noted that an affirmative defense does not mean that the party making the
promise or payment will be not be prosecuted. It simply means that if prosecuted, the
person can raise the affirmative defense and prove it before a jury. In other words, the
defendant bears the burden of proof as to the affirmative defense at trial, 46 and the risk
that a jury may not believe that lavish entertainment falls within it.
There are widespread misconceptions about what other affirmative defenses may exist
under the FCPA. Other than those mentioned above, there are none. It is not an affirma-
tive defense that the corporation is not a public company; that everyone does it, that it is
the culture in the country where the payment is made to make bribes, that the corporation
paying the bribe is small and only occasionally does business abroad, or that the briber is
not an American. As the elements of the statute above reflect, the FCPA's jurisdictional
base is extremely broad and encompasses anyone paying a bribe to influence an official act
of a foreign public official or to have that official refrain from acting in order to retain
business.
E. LN rENT
There are three types of intent expressed in the statute. First, the offer, payment, or
promise must be done "corruptly."47 Second, the offer, promise, or payment made to a
third party must be done knowing that all or a portion of such payment will go to a
"foreign official. ' 4s Finally, in order to sustain a criminal prosecution of the statute, the
violator must have engaged in that violation "willfully."49
To be corrupt, "the offer, promise to pay, payment, or authorization of payment, must
be intended to induce the recipient to misuse his official position"511 in order to obtain or
retain business. This corrupt intent can be proven circumstantially. For example, in U.S.
v. Liebo, the officer of a U.S. corporation was convicted of giving airplane tickets to the
cousin of the chief of maintenance of the Nigerian Air Force to obtain presidential ap-
proval of a contract to maintain C-130 cargo planes. 5' Although the cousin testified that
the tickets were a personal gift, the jury found that Liebo acted corruptly because of the
close relationship between the cousin and the chief of maintenance's important role in the
contract approval process, together with the fact that the gift was given shortly before
approval.5 2 Thus, while prosecutors must approve a quid pro quo,53 that quid pro quo can
and often is proven through circumstantial evidence.
With respect to payments made to a third party, the government must prove that the
payment or promise thereof was made "knowing that all or a portion of such money or the
thing of value will be offered, given, or promised ... to any foreign official."54 Thus, the
"knowing" requirement entails nothing more than knowledge that the target of the pay-
ment or offer will be a public official. Knowledge includes willful blindness, which is
46. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(c)(2) (2008).
47. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(a) (2008).
48. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(a)(3) (2008).
49. "Willful" intent is required for certain enhanced penalties. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(g)(2) (2008).
50. United States v. Liebo, 923 F.2d 1308, 1312 (8th Cir. 1991).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. United States v. Johnson, 621 F.2d 1073, 1076 (10th Cir. 1980).
54. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a)(3) (2008).
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defined as "deliberate ignorance which may be inferred where a defendant has failed to
establish an honest contrary belief."55 It includes "any instance where any reasonable per-
son would have realized the existence of the circumstances or result and the defendant has
consciously chose[n] not to ask about what he had reason to believe he would discover."5 6
Courts have applied an appropriate mix of subjective and objective standards to find will-
ful blindness. 57
In order to establish "willfulness" for purposes of a criminal statute, the prosecution
need only show that the defendant committed an act knowingly. In other words, he must
have known that the act was unlawful; he need not know of any specific statute outlawing
it, as long as he knows his conduct is wrong. A defendant is not entitled to an instruction
that he must know the terms of the statute he is accused of violating.5 8 Thus, if the
government can prove that the payment was made to induce an official act or its omission
in order to obtain or retain business, it has proven willfulness. As one court noted, the
term "corruptly" is virtually interchangeable with the term "willfully."5 9
A corporate issuer convicted of a violation of the FCPA is subject to a fine of $25
million. 60 An individual may be fined up to $5 million, and imprisoned for more than
twenty years. 6 1 There is an alternative maximum fine statute, which provides for a fine of
up to two times the amount of the pecuniary gain of a defendant or the pecuniary loss
suffered by a victim. 6 2 A civil violation will result in a fine of $2 million for an issuer and a
civil penalty of $10,000.63 The SEC and the Justice Department have concurrent jurisdic-
tion over issuers. In addition to the fines that can be levied against an issuer, the SEC may
also seek injunctive relief.64
The FCPA does not criminalize the receipt of a bribe by a foreign official.65
H. Recent U.S. Prosecutions
In the last several years, the Justice Department and the SEC have vigorously enforced
the FCPA.
On February 11, 2009, the SEC "announced settlements with KBR, Inc. and Hallibur-
ton Co. to resolve SEC charges that KBR subsidiary Kellogg, Brown & Root LLC bribed
Nigerian government officials over a 10-year period, in violation of the . . . FCPA[ ], in
order to obtain construction contracts. ' 66 The SEC also alleged "that KBR and Hallibur-
55. See Joint Statement, supra note 40.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. U.S. v. Kay, 513 F.3d 432, 451 (5th Cir. 2007), rehearing denied, 513 F.3d 461 (5th Cit. 2008).
59. Id.
60. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (2008).
61. Id.
62. 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d) (2008).
63. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(c) (2008).
64. 15 U.S.C. § 78u.
65. United States v. Blondek, 741 F.2d Supp. 116 (N.D. Tex. 1990), affd, United States v. Castle, 925 F.2d
831 (5th Cir. 1991).
66. Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges KBR and Halliburton for FCPA Violations (February 11, 2009),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-23.htm.
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ton, KBR's former parent company, engaged in books and records violations and internal
controls violations related to the bribery."67
The SEC alleged that beginning as early as 1994, members of a four-company joint
venture composed of Kellogg, Brown & Root LLC's predecessor companies, "determined
that it was necessary to pay to bribes to officials within the Nigerian government in order
to obtain the construction contracts. 68 The SEC also alleged that the internal controls of
Halliburton, the parent company of the KBR predecessor entities from 1998 to 2006,
failed to detect or prevent the bribery, and that Halliburton records were falsified as a
result of the bribery scheme. Under the SEC settlement, KBR and Halliburton have
agreed to pay $177 million in disgorgement to settle the SEC's charges.69 In a related
proceeding, the Justice Department announced on February 11, 2009, that KBR had pled
guilty to one count of conspiring to violate the FCPA and to four counts of violating the
anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA.70 Under its plea agreement, Kellogg, Brown & Root
LLP is required to pay a criminal fine of $402 million and to retain a monitor to review
and evaluate KBR's policies and procedures as they relate to compliance with the FCPA.71
On December 15, 2008, the SEC "announced an unprecedented settlement with Sie-
mens AG to resolve SEC charges that the Munich, Germany-based manufacturer of in-
dustrial and consumer products violated the FCPA."72 Among the SEC's allegations were
that Siemens paid bribes on a wide variety of transactions, including "the design and con-
struction of metro transit lines in Venezuela, power plants in Israel, and refineries in Mex-
ico." 73 It was also alleged that Siemens "used bribes to obtain such business as developing
mobile telephone networks in Bangladesh, national identity cards in Argentina, and medi-
cal devices in Vietnam, China, and Russia." 74 The SEC described the misconduct as in-
volving employees at all levels, including former senior management and "revealed a
corporate culture long at odds with the FCPA."75 The SEC noted that "the tone at the
top at Siemens was inconsistent with an effective FCPA compliance program and created a
corporate culture in which bribery was tolerated and even rewarded at the highest levels of
the company." 76
As part of the settlement, Siemens "agreed to pay $350 million in disgorgement to settle
the SEC's charges, and a $450 million fine to the [U.S. Justice Department] to settle
criminal charges." 77 The SEC reported that "Siemens also will pay a fine of approxi-
mately $569 million to the Office of the Prosecutor General in Munich, to whom the




70. Press Release, Dept. of Justice, Kellogg Brown & Root LLC Pleads Guilty to Foreign Bribery Charges
and Agrees to Pay $402 Million Criminal Fine (February 11, 2009), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/
2009/February/09-crin- 112.html.
71. Id.








VOL. 42, NO. 4
EXPANDING CRIMINALIZATION OF TRANSNATIONAL BRIBERY 1269
ing to SEC Chairman Christopher Cox in announcing the settlement: "Siemens paid stag-
gering amounts of money to circumvent the rules and gain business. Now, they will pay
for it with the largest settlement in the history of the [FCPA] since it became law in
1977." 79 SEC Enforcement Division Director Linda Thomsen described Siemens' con-
duct as "unprecedented in scale and geographic reach" and referred to the SEC's work on
the matter as "bringing the company to justice."80
Also in 2008, Volvo, a Swedish company that provides commercial transportation solu-
tions (not the car manufacturer), agreed with U.S. ADR's to pay $12.6 million in civil
penalties, disgorgement, and interest in connection with two subsidiaries' payments of $6
million in kickbacks and additional payments of $2.4 million in connection with their sale
of humanitarian goods to Iraq under the U.N. Oil for Food Program.si The kickbacks
were in the form of after-sale service fees with no bona fide services performed. The
after-sale service fees were added to the costs of subcontractors that outfitted trucks tai-
lored to Iraqi military specifications. One subsidiary also made improper payments to
obtain business through a Jordanian agent. In settling with the SEC, Volvo agreed to
cease further violations of the books and records provisions of the 1934 Act and paid
disgorgement of $7.2 million in profits, plus $1.3 million in prejudgment interest, and a
civil penalty of $4 million. 82 Pursuant to a deferred prosecution agreement with the Jus-
tice Department, Volvo paid $7 million and agreed to a review of its existing internal
controls policies and procedures. 83
On November 17, 2008, Shu Quan-Sheng pled guilty "to charges that he illegally ex-
ported space launch technical data and defense services to the People's Republic of China
(PRC) and offered bribes to Chinese government officials."1 4 Count three of the informa-
tion alleged that Shu paid, promised, or authorized bribes to Chinese government officials
"on behalf of his company, AMAC, and a French company that he represented ... to
obtain a contract for the development of a 600 liter per hour liquid hydrogen tank
system."8 5
On September 4, 2008, Albert Stanley, the head of M.W. Kellog and later KBR, which
became a Halliburton subsidiary, pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to violate the
FCPA and one count of committing mail and wire fraud related to the FCPA violation. 6
He also consented to an SEC action enjoining violations of the anti-bribery and books and
records provisions of the FCPA.s7 The charges resulted from a ten-year scheme to bribe
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Press Release, SEC, SEC Files Settled Books and Records and Internal Controls Charges Against AB




84. Press Release, Dept. of Justice, Virginia Physicist Pleads Guilty to Illegally Exporting Space Launch
Data to China and Offering Bribes to Chinese Officials (Nov. 17, 2008), available at www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/
2008/November/08-nsd- 1020.html.
85. Id.
86. Press Release, Dept. of Justice, Former Officer and Director of Global Engineering and Construction
Company Pleads Guilty to Foreign Bribery and Kickback Charges (Sept. 3, 2008), available at http://www.
usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2008/September/08-crm-772.html.
87. Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Former CEO of Kellog, Brown & Root, Inc. with Foreign Bribery
(Sept. 3, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2008/lr20700.htn.
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Nigerian government officials to obtain contracts by a joint venture in which KBR was a
member to build liquefied natural gas facilities in Bonny Island, Nigeria.88 The payments
were funneled through agents.
In November of 2007, the SEC charged Chevron Corporation for contracting with
third parties, which paid Chevron $20 million in illegal kickback payments in connection
with their purchase of crude oil under the U.N. Oil for Food program while knowing that
the third parties paid a portion of the premiums received to Iraq as illegal surcharges
prohibited under the Oil for Food Program and U.S. trade sanctions on Iraq.89 Although
Chevron took steps and adopted policies to prevent illegal surcharges, these proved inade-
quate, and, indeed, Chevron's own internal documents showed that it was aware of the
cost of doing business in Iraq. Consequently, Chevron failed to devise a system of internal
accounting controls to detect and prevent illicit payments. Chevron consented to an in-
junction from violating the books and records and internal control provisions of the secur-
ities laws, disgorged $25 million in profits, and paid a civil penalty of $3 million. 90
Chevron satisfied its disgorgement obligation by paying $20 million pursuant to an agree-
ment with the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York and $5 mil-
lion pursuant to an agreement with the Manhattan District Attorney's Office. 91 It also
paid a penalty of $2 million to the Office of Foreign Asset Control.92
In October of 2007, York International Corporation entered into a deferred prosecution
agreement due to improper payments to government officials in Bahrain, Egypt, India,
Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and kickbacks in Iraq in violation of the
U.N. Oil for Food program. York agreed to pay $10 million in criminal fines and settled
an SEC matter by paying $2 million in penalties and approximately $10 million in dis-
gorged profits and interest.93
In September of 2007, Paradigm B.V. entered into a non-prosecution agreement in
connection with payments made to officials in China, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Nigeria, and
Indonesia pursuant to which it agreed to "pay a $1 million penalty, implement vigorous
internal controls, retain outside compliance counsel, and cooperate fully with the Ejustice
Department]." 94 These illicit payments were uncovered during due diligence for an up-
coming initial public offering.95
88. Id.
89. Press Release, United States Attorney Southern District of New York, Chevron Corporation Agrees to





93. Press Release, Dept. of Justice, Justice Department Agrees to Defer Prosecution of York International
Corporation in Connection With Payment of Kickbacks Under the U.N. Oil For Food Program (Oct. 1,
2007), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2007/October/07 crm_783.html.
94. Press Release, Dept. of Justice, Paradigm BY. Agrees to Pay $1 Million Penalty to Resolve Foreign
Bribery Issues in Multiple Countries (Sept. 24, 2007), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2007/Septem-
ber/07_crm75 l.htnl.
95. Id.
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In September of 2007, Stephen Head, a former president of Titan Corporation's opera-
tions in Africa, was sentenced to six months incarceration and a $5,000 fine after pleading
guilty to charges in connection with a $3.5 million payment to officials in Benin.96
In August of 2007, the SEC charged the manufacturer Textron, Inc.'s French subsidiar-
ies, which made "$650,539 in kickback payments in connection with [the] sale of humani-
tarian goods to Iraq under the U.N. Oil for Food Program" in the form of after-service
fees for which no bona fide services were rendered. 97 These kickbacks bypassed the U.N.
escrow and were paid by third parties to Iraqi- controlled accounts. Textron also "made
illicit payments of $114,995 to secure thirty-six contracts in the UAE, Bangladesh, Indo-
nesia, Egypt, and India from 2001 to 2005." 98 In the SEC action, Textron consented to an
injunction enjoining future violations of the books and records provisions of the 1934 Act
and paid $2.28 million in disgorgement, $450,461.68 in prejudgment interest, and
$88,000 in civil fines.99 The Justice Department entered into a non-prosecution agree-
ment pursuant to which Textron agreed to pay $1.15 million in fines.' 00 The government
agreed not to file criminal charges due to Textron's early discovery and reporting of the
improper payments, its thorough review of the payments, and its implementation of en-
hanced compliance policies and procedures.' 0l
In July of 2007, Jason Steph, a former manager of a Nigerian based subsidiary of Willb-
ros Group, Inc., an oil and gas service corporation, was indicted in connection with pay-
ments to a Nigerian official at the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation and the
Peoples Democratic Party. 0 2
In June of 2007, Leo Winston Smith, a former executive vice president and director of
sales and marketing at Pacific Consolidated Industries (Pacific), was indicted for conspir-
acy to pay bribes of $300,000 to an official at the Ministry of Defense in Great Britain to
influence the award of an $11 million contact. 10 3 Pacific referred the matter to the Justice
Department as a result of due diligence performed during a merger. On May 8, 2008,
Martin Self, a U.S. citizen and partial owner and president of Pacific, pled guilty to two
counts of violating the FCPA in connection with payments of more than $70,000 made by
Smith to a relative of a Ministry of Defense official in exchange for obtaining contracts for
Pacific.'0 4 Self admitted that when he initiated the wire transfer to the relative, he delib-
erately avoided learning the true facts relating to the nature and purpose of the
payment. 1
05
96. See United States v. Head, No. 3:06 Crim. 01380-BEN (S.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2007).
97. Press Release, SEC, SEC Files Settled Books and Records and Internal Controls Charges Against Tex-





101. Press Release, Dept. ofJustice, Textron Inc. Agrees to $1.15 Million Fine in Connection with Payment
of $600,000 in Kickbacks by its French Subsidiaries under the United Nations Oil for Food Program, (Aug.
23, 2007) available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2007/August/07-crm-646.html.
102. Press Release, Dept. of Justice, Former Executive of Willbros Subsidiary Pleads Guilty to Conspiring
to Bribe Nigerian Government Officials (Nov. 5, 2007), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2007/No-
vember/07 crm 885.html.
103. See United States v. Smith, No. 8:07 Crim. 00069 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2007).
104. Id.
105. Id. This is an example of the "willful blindness" issue, discussed above.
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In June of 2007, Christian Sapsizian, a French citizen and former Alcatel CIT executive,
pled guilty of two counts of violating and conspiring to violate the FCPA in connection
with payments to influence Costa Rica's state-owned telecommunications authority to
award Alcatel a mobile telephone contract. Alcatel was a French telecommunications
company whose ADRs were traded on the New York Stock Exchange.i06 This prosecu-
tion demonstrates the wide jurisdiction sweep of the FCPA.
In June of 2007, Si Chan Wooh, a former senior executive of Schnitzer Steel Industries,
Inc., pled guilty to conspiracy to make payments to officers and employees of government
owned steel mills in China to buy scrap metal from Schnitzer.10 7 In December of 2007,
Robert W. Phillip, the former chairman and CEO of Schnitzer, signed a consent decree
without admitting or denying allegations that he had approved cash payments and other
gifts to Chinese government officials at state owned steel mills to solicit business. He
disgorged $169,863.79 in bonuses and paid $16,536.63 in pre-judgment interest and a
$75,000 civil penalty and injunction. 08
In February 2007, three subsidiaries of Vetco International Ltd., a privately held oil and
gas field service provider, pled guilty to conspiracy to violate the FCPA and paid a com-
bined $26 million fine in connection with payment to an official of the Nigerian Customs
Service to avoid payment of customs duties and obtain the release of goods and equip-
ment. 109 Aibel Group, Ltd., another wholly owned subsidiary of Vetco International Ltd.,
entered into a deferred prosecution agreement. Subsequently, Aibel was sold to a private
equity group and resold to Norwegian owners. In November 2008, it pled guilty to a two
count superseding indictment charging a conspiracy to violate the FCPA and a violation of
the FCPA; admitted it was not in compliance with its deferred prosecution agreement; and
agreed to pay a $4.2 million criminal fine. 110
In February of 2007, Baker Hughes paid the largest combined criminal and civil fine, up
to that date, to resolve a Justice Department criminal investigation and SEC enforcement
action involving improper payments to officials in Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Angola, Indone-
sia, Russia, and Uzbekistan. Baker Hughes entered into a deferred prosecution agree-
ment, which required the appointment of a monitor, and consented to an injunction
enjoining it from future violations of the books and records provisions of the 1934 Act."'
It also agreed to an $11 million criminal fine, disgorgement, and prejudgment interest of
106. Press Release, Dept. of Justice, Former Alcatel Executive Pleads Guilty to Participation in Payment of
$2.5 Million in Bribes to Senior Costa Rican Officials to Obtain a Mobile Telephone Contract (June 7, 2007),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2007/June/07 crm 41 1.html.
107. Press Release, Dept. of Justice, Former Senior Officer of Schnitzer Steel Industries Inc. Subsidiary
Pleads Guilty to Foreign Bribes (June 29, 2007), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2007/June/07-crm
_474.html.
108. Id. Wooh and Schnitzer also agreed to disgorgement and fines in a settlement with the SEC. Press
Release, SEC, SEC Settles Charges Against Former Portland Steel Executive for Anti-Bribery Statute Viola-
tions (June 29, 2007), available at http://sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2007/lr20174.htm [hereinafter SEC
Settles].
109. Press Release, Dept. of Justice, Aibel Group Ltd. Pleads Guilty to Foreign Bribery and Agrees to Pay
$4.2 Million in Criminal Fines (Nov. 21, 2008), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2008/November/
08-crm-1041.html.
110. Id.
111. See Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Baker Hughes With Foreign Bribery and With Violating 2001
Commission Cease-and-Desist Order (April 26, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigationlitreleases/
2007/lr20094.htm.
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$23 million together with a $10 million civil penalty. 12 Its former business development
manager, Roy Fearnley, was also charged in the same complaint, which sought disgorge-
ment, prejudgment interest, and civil penalties as well as an injunction against future vio-
lations by Fearnley of section 30A and section 13(b)(5) of the 1934 Act, both as a primary
violator and as an aider and abettor. 1
3
In October of 2006, Statoil, a Norway based foreign issuer that had no U.S. operations
but did have ADRs traded on the New York Stock Exchange and was registered pursuant
to section 12(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, entered into a Justice Department de-
ferred prosecution agreement based upon bribe payments to an Iranian government offi-
cial in return for its influence to assist Statoil in obtaining a contract to develop oil and gas
fields in Iran and open doors to additional projects. 14 The bribes were paid pursuant to a
vaguely defined consulting contract with an offshore intermediary company organized in
the Turks and Caicos Islands and owned by a third party in London. In a related SEC
cease and desist order, Statoil agreed to disgorge $10.5 million, pay a penalty of $10.5
million, and accept a compliance monitor to oversee its compliance program for three
years. 115
In October of 2006, Schnitzer Steel Industries, Inc. agreed to cease and desist from
committing or causing any violation of the books and records provision of the 1934 Act,
disgorge $6.2 million, and pay prejudgment interest of $1.1 million.'16 It also agreed to
certain undertakings, including a compliance consultant for three years to review and eval-
uate its internal controls, record keeping, and financial reporting policies and proce-
dures.'1 7 It also entered into a deferred prosecution agreement, and one of its subsidiaries
entered a guilty plea in the Federal Judicial District of Oregon. The deferred prosecution
was a result of Schnitzer's voluntary disclosure, conducting an extensive internal investiga-
tion, sharing the results of that investigation promptly with the Justice Department, taking
appropriate disciplinary action against wrongdoers including replacing senior manage-
ment, and taking significant remedial steps including implementation of a robust compli-
ance plan.' "'
IML Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
As noted above, U.S. companies complained bitterly when the FCPA was first passed,
arguing that they were at a competitive disadvantage with their foreign counterparts. To
address this, the federal government launched an international campaign to get other na-
tions to join its crusade against transnational bribery. It achieved its greatest success with
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The OECD
came into existence in September of 1961 in order to promote policies designed to achieve
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Press Release, United States Attorney Southern District of New York, U.S. Resolves Probe Against Oil
Company That Bribed Iranian Official (Oct. 13, 2006), available at http://ww.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2006/Octo-
ber/06_crm_700.html.
115. Id.
116. In re Schnitzer Steel Industries Inc., SEC, Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No. 54606
(Oct. 16, 2006), available at htp://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2006/34- 54606.pdf.
117. Id.
118. See SEC Settles, supra note 108.
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the highest attainable economic growth and employment and to raise standards of living
in member countries while maintaining financial stability and contributing to the develop-
ment of the world economy and sound economic expansion of world trade on a multi-
lateral non-discriminatory basis in accordance with international obligations.119 The orig-
inal members of the OECD were Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany,
Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United States, and the United Kingdom. Subsequently,
Japan, Finland, Australia, New Zealand, Mexico, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland,
Korea, and the Slovak Republic joined.' 2°
As a result of U.S. pressure, fighting corruption became one of the top priorities of the
OECD, and the OECD Convention has become one its foremost accomplishments. The
OECD Convention, which was adopted in November of 1997 and enforced beginning in
February 1999, commits member states and signatories to implement domestic laws
prohibiting bribery of foreign officials. As of 2007, the OECD Convention had thirty-six
signatories, including all of the members of the OECD and six non-members:121 Argen-
tina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Estonia, and Slovenia. 122 In 2003, the United Nations fur-
thered the OECD's efforts by adopting the UNCAC, which commits its signatories to
implement domestic laws outlawing both foreign and domestic bribery. The UNCAC
was implemented in December of 2005 and has since had eighty-one countries ratify or
accede to it.123
While the FCPA and both the OECD and UNCAC prohibit "active" bribery, e.g., "the
paying of a bribe to a foreign or international public official," the FCPA and OECD
Convention do not address "passive" bribery, e.g., the receipt of the bribe by the foreign
public official. Indeed, one court has held that foreign government officials receiving
bribes cannot be prosecuted under the conspiracy statute because Congress' exclusion of
them from the FCPA demonstrates its intent not to criminalize their conduct. 24 Unlike
the OECD Convention, the UNCAC has an optional provision that would encourage
signatories to pass laws targeting "passive" bribery of a foreign or international public
official. Otherwise, the OECD Convention and the UNCAC have essentially the same
elements with respect to the offer or promise of a bribe to a foreign public official. In
both conventions, like the FCPA, bribery of a foreign public official is an offense when the
bribe is paid in order to obtain or retain business or other undue advantage in relation to
the conduct of international business. 25
Like the FCPA, the OECD Convention and the UNCAC also contain an autonomous
definition of the term "foreign public official," so that reference to the definition of a
public official under the law of that foreign public official's country is unnecessary. 126
119. OECD, CORRUPTION: GLOSSARY OF INTERNATIONAL CRLXSINAL STANDARDS (OECD Publishing
2008) (2008). [hereinafter OECD Glossary).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 3.
122. Id. at ch. 1, n. 2.
123. Id. at 13.
124. United States v. Castle, 925 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1991).
125. OECD Glossary, supra note 119, at 26.
126. Id. at 34.
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This common definition also assists in avoiding the obstacles that were often presented in
ascertaining the foreign law or because the foreign law contained loopholes.
Both the OECD Convention and the UNCAC, like the FCPA, address bribes paid to
order officials to act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties.
12 7
This concept of a quid pro quo between the bribe and the official's actions or omissions is
similar to provisions under U.S. federal law with respect to payments of domestic
bribes. 128  Like the FCPA, the conventions also prohibit bribery through
intermediaries. 12
9
Like U.S. forfeiture laws, 130 both the OECD Convention and the UNCAC require
their signatory states to be able to confiscate the funds used for the bribes, the proceeds of
the bribes, and, to the extent possible under their legal systems, seize the property, equip-
ment, or other instrumentalities that were used or intended to be used in the commission
of the offense. For example, if a briber uses a private jet to meet the public official and
deliver the bribe, the jet would be subject to seizure.i3i
The OECD Convention has affirmative defenses that are similar to the U.S. FCPA. In
commentary 8, the OECD Convention creates a defense where the payment is permitted
or required by written law or regulation of the foreign public official's country, including
case law. 132 Further, the OECD Convention provides a defense for small facilitating pay-
ments, such as the issuance of a license or a permit.' 33 The UNCAC gives its member
states a great deal of flexibility and allows the member states parties to provide defenses
that are applicable to the offenses established under the UNCAC.'3
4
Since the Supreme Court's decision in New York Central Railroad Company v. U.S. in
1909,135 the United States has imposed criminal liability on corporations for criminal acts
127. Id. at 38.
128. United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers, 526 U.S. 398 (1999).
129. OECD Glossary, supra note 119, at 38.
130. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) (2008) (authorizing the forfeiture of the proceeds but only the pro-
ceeds of a long list of federal criminal offenses); 16 U.S.C. § 470(gg) (2008) (authorizing forfeiture of tools
and equipment used to steal archaeological treasures, but not the proceeds of such offense); 18 U.S.C. § 492
(2008) (authorizing the forfeiture of counterfeiting equipment but not the proceeds of such offense); 18
U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A) and 982(a)(1) (2008) (authorizing civil and criminal forfeiture, respectively, of all prop-
erty involved in a money laundering offense); 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(2) (2008) (authorizing forfeiture of any
property giving a defendant a source of influence over a racketeering enterprise); 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(G)
(2008) (authorizing forfeiture of all assets of a person engaged in terrorism). See generally, Stefan D. Cassella,
Overview of Asset Forfeiture Law in the United States, 17 S. ApR. J. CRL.I. JUST. 347 (2004).
131. OECD Glossary, supra note 119 at 45.
132. Id. at 50.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. New York Central R. Co. v. U.S., 212 U.S. 481 (1909); see also United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp.,
467 F. 2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1972); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 307 F.2d 120 (5th Cir.). In United States v.
Ionia Management, SA., Nos. 07-5801-cr, 08-1387-cr, 2009 WL 116966 (2nd Cir. Jan. 20. 2009), the appel-
lant argued to the Second Circuit that the courts have mistakenly applied the Supreme Court's decision in
New York Central and challenged the application of respondeat superior liability for crimes committed by
employees within the scope of their employment. According to the appellant, the Supreme Court's decision
in New York Central was based on the Elkins Act's explicit congressional mandate imposing liability upon a
corporate defendant for acts of its employees. The vast majority of federal criminal statutes, however, includ-
ing the FCPA, contain no indication that Congress intended the misconduct of employees be imputed to
their employer. The appellant claimed that recent Title VII cases from the Supreme Court make it clear that
respondeat superior should not be applied as a default position in criminal cases and that liability should be
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of corporate employees and agents committed within the scope of their employment or
agency and that served as a benefit, even if only in part, to the corporate employer. Until
recently, most civil law countries did not impose such corporate or entity liability. As a
result of the OECD Convention and the UNCAC, however, this practice is changing.
Article 2 of the OECD Convention provides that each party shall take measures as may
be necessary in accordance with its legal principles to establish the liability of legal persons
for the bribery of foreign public officials.i36 Article 3(2) provides that if "criminal respon-
sibility is not applicable to legal persons, the member state shall insure that the legal per-
son shall be subject to effective, proportionate and dissuasive non-criminal sanctions"
including monetary penalties.' 37 Article 26 of the UNCAC also provides for liability of
legal persons consistent with the country's legal principles. That liability may be criminal,
civil, or administrative.' 38 As a result, many jurisdictions have imposed liability against
legal persons. Some have followed the American rule imposing liability if an agent per-
forming the criminal act did it for the benefit of the corporation. 139 For example, in
Canada, criminal liability may be imposed upon a corporation if the act was engaged in
"by design, or resulted partly for the benefit of" the corporation. 4° Germany, on the
other hand, "requires proof that the 'legal entity' ... has gained, or was supposed to have
gained, a profit." 141 Others, like France, have adopted a broader definition imposing lia-
bility upon a legal person if the criminal act was performed in the course of activities
intended to advance the organization, its operations or its objectives, even if no benefit or
advantage results. 142 To avoid determining whether an act was performed for the benefit
of the corporation, some countries merely require a connection with the business of the
legal person. For example, Japan requires that the criminal act be performed "'with re-
gard to the business of the legal entity." ' 143 Korea requires that the bribe be in relation to
the legal person's business. 144
Other countries reject this approach and provide that a corporation is liable only where
the criminal act was performed or authorized by a management level official. 145 In es-
sence, they adopt the position of the Model Penal Code in the United States. 146 For
example, in Italy a corporation can only be held criminally liable if a senior level official
limited to "managerial" employees. The appellant urged that corporate criminal liability is inappropriate
unless authorized by high ranking officers or directors or where there is a strong compliance program in
place. The Second Circuit rejected these arguments, holding that criminal liability is not limited to actions
stemming from "managerial" employees and that a compliance program does not immunize the corporation
from liability for the acts of employees committed within the scope of their employment, no matter how
extensive.
136. OECD Convention, art. 2. For purposes of this article, a "legal person" refers to a corporation, limited
liability company, partnership, or other institutional organization that is not a natural person.
137. OECD Convention, art. 3(2).
138. OECD Glossary, supra note 119, at 61.
139. U.S. v. Hilton Hotels Corp. 467 F.2d 1000, 1007 (9th Cir. 1972).
140. OECD Glossary, spra note 119, at 62.
141. Id.




146. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07 (2008) (This is the position appellants have urged on the Second Circuit
in Ionia Management, supra, note 126).
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has either performed a criminal act or authorized it. 147 Australia takes a very different
approach. It would impose corporate criminal liability where the "corporate culture" di-
rected, encouraged, tolerated, or led to the offense148
Unlike the United States, where the existence of a compliance program does not pro-
vide a defense for a corporation, many jurisdictions will take into account whether the
corporation took measures to prevent, supervise, and deter the commission of the crime.
For example, in Italy and Korea, it is a complete defense to show that the corporation
exercised due diligence.
IV. Implementation of International Conventions
As one might expect, various countries have taken diverse approaches to implementing
international conventions, with some vigorously enforcing them and others being virtually
unaware of their provisions. Over time, however, these international conventions have
and will gain greater importance and will be more vigorously enforced. Indeed, unlike the
United States, where an international law does not supersede a contrary domestic law,
149
in other countries, the converse is true. For example, under article 10(1) of the Italian
Constitution, where a domestic law conflicts with an international treaty or convention to
which Italy is a party, the international instrument prevails.150 Article 1(7) of the Italian
Constitution further provides that if a law is enacted by a state or region and does not
comply with international law, it is unconstitutional.151
A. GERMANY
Germany has been the most vigorous of all countries aside from the United States in
enforcing its foreign corrupt practices laws. It is estimated that there are currently forty-
three prosecutions in Germany and eighty-eight pending investigations.5 2 A Munich
court imposed a 201 million euro or $287 million penalty, including 200 million euros, in
disgorgement of profits and a million euro fine on Siemens in October of 2007 in connec-
tion with charges involving its communications group's bribery of public officials in Nige-
ria, Russia, and Libya.' 5 3 Also, the company reached a settlement with tax authorities
147. OECD Glossary, supra note 119, at 64.
148. Id.
149. In the United States, treaties entered into by the President with the "advice and consent" of the Senate
have the force of federal law. Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924). If there is a conflict
between a federal statute and a treaty, the later-in-time rule prevails. United States v. Palestine Liberation
Organization, 695 F.Supp. 1456, 1465 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (citing RFSrATEmEN-'r (THIRD) FOREIGN RELA-
TiONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATEs § 1 15(l)(a) (1988)). International law that has not been given Senate
consent and ratified by the President does not carry the force of law in the United States.
150. Const. Italia art. 10(1), available at http://servat.unibe.ch/icl/it-0000.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2009)
(Article 10 of the Italian Constitution states that "the legal system of Italy conforms to the generally recog-
nized principals of international law").
151. Id.
152. Fritz Heinmann & Gillian Dell, Progress Report OECD Anti-Bribery Convention 2008, TRANSPARENCY
INTERNATIONAL, June 24, 2008, at 23 (June 24, 2008) [hereinafter OECD Progress Report].
153. David Crawford and Mike Esterl, Inside Bribery Probe of Siemens, WALL ST. J., Dec. 28, 2007, at A4,
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 119879170772353601.html?mod=googlenewswsj; Press Release,
Dept. of Justice, Siemens AG and Three Subsidiaries Plead Guilty to Foreign Corrupt Practices Violations
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involving the payment of over 179 million Euros plus interest on back taxes and other tax
charges assessed regarding other groups and entities.15 4
In May 2007, the Regional Court in Damstad sentenced two former Siemens employees
to suspended prison sentences and ordered Siemens to disgorge millions in profits involv-
ing bribes paid to obtain contracts from the Italian utility Enel Power. 55 The Federal
Court of Justice, however, threw out the judgment against Siemens and reversed its brib-
ery convictions in August 2008 because prior to 2002 "bribery was only a crime if it
harmed competition between German companies;" because no other German companies
had bid on the contract, and Enel was not a German company, the payments did not
constitute corruption.' 5 6 Instead, the court ruled that because the money was funneled
through slush funds, the concealment of the money constituted improper use of funds.157
There are also reported to be investigations regarding firearm bribery cases relating to
Bristol-Myers and Daimler Chrysler.' 58
B. ITALY
Italy has implemented the OECD Convention by extending Article 322 bis (2) of its
criminal code to extend domestic active bribery offenses to foreign public officials.5 9 It-
aly has also enacted Legislative Decree 231 imposing administrative liability against legal
persons, such as a corporation for the offense of foreign bribery. 160 Prior to this decree,
legal persons could not be held liable under Italian law. In Italy, however, a legal entity
will not be held liable if its management has adopted an effective compliance program to
prevent the offense. The responsibility for adopting a compliance program rests with the
legal entity; however, the compliance programs may be submitted for approval to the
Ministry of Justice. While approval would not preclude prosecution, it will be taken into
account by the courts as prima facie evidence that the company made a reasonable effort
to prevent the commission of the offense and is a mitigating factor at sentencing.16
Italy has been vigorous in the prosecution and sanctioning of foreign bribery cases. For
example, in 1999 Enel Power SPA obtained three contracts to construct power and distil-
lation plants in Abu Dhabi, UAE, Oman, and Qatar. Enel Power in turn subcontracted
part of the contracts to Siemens AG, which was to provide gas turbines for part of the
and Agree to Pay $450 Million in Combined Fines (December 15, 2008), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
opa/jn/2008/December/08-crm-1 105.html; Siemens Paid Millions of Euros in Bribes in Russia, Nigeria,
Libya, KOMMERSANT, Nov. 16, 2007, available at http://www.kommersant.com/p-11656/r_500/Siemens_
bribes_/.
154. Id.
155. Markus Balser, In Germany, Bribery Doesn't Always Mean Corruption, Siemens Finds, WALL ST. J. LAW




158. OECD Progress Report, supra note 152, at 22-23.
159, OECD DIRECTORATE FOR FINANCIAL AND ENTERPRISE AFFAIRS, ITALY: PHASE II REPORT ON THE
APPLICATION OF THE CONvEN-rION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTER-
NATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS AND THE 1997 RECOMMENDATION ON COMBATING BRIBERY IN IN-
TERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONs 7 (2004).
160. Id. at 10.
161. Id. at 11.
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project, and Alstom, which agreed to supply several boilers. Both Siemens and Alstom
transferred about six million Euros into foreign bank accounts for the two senior officers
of Enel Power, which was controlled by the government of Italy. These two officers were
ultimately charged with conspiracy to embezzle and conspiracy to request illegal disburse-
ments from the contractors and with domestic passive bribery. Siemens and Alstom were
charged with bribery of Italian officials, and in 2004 a Milan court banned Siemens from
selling gas turbines to the Italian public administration for one year. The two senior
officials of Enel Power are also being investigated for bribing foreign officials to secure
the contracts for Enel Power. 62
C. SouTH AFRICA
In 2004, South Africa banned the bribery of foreign public officials with the passage of
the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act of 2004 (PCCA).163 The South
African Parliament approved the OECD Convention in August 2006. As a consequence,
under section 231(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1999, the
OECD Convention is binding in South Africa.' 64 South African law is applicable to both
natural and legal persons alike; 165 thus a legal person can be criminally liable in South
Africa, and a corporation can be vicariously liable for the acts of its employees committed
in the course and within the scope of their employment. Even if an employee exceeds his
authorization, if he is acting in furtherance of the interests of the corporation, vicarious
liability applies. 16
6
Like the American FCPA, South African law also contains a books and records provi-
sion. Section 284 of the South African law requires that all companies maintain account-
ing records to ensure fair representation of their state of affairs and business, including
showing assets and liabilities of the company, a register of fixed assets, records containing
entries from day to day in sufficient detail, and records of goods sold and purchased and
annual statements of stockholders. 167 Section 286 requires directors to present annual
financial statements that fairly represent the state of affairs of companies, and section
286(2)(d) provides that such statements must include an auditor's report.' 68 Auditors in
South Africa are required to report irregularities to the Independent Regulatory Board of
Auditors as provided under section 45 of the Auditing Profession Act of 2005.169 A re-
portable irregularity is an unlawful act or omission committed by a person responsible for
the management of the audited company.
170
The PCCA in South Africa appears to be extremely broad, banning any use of a foreign
public official's position to influence any act or decision that amounts to illegal, dishonest,
unauthorized, incomplete, or biased action; abuse of authority; breach of trust; the viola-
162. Id. at 25-26.
163. Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004.
164. OECD DIRECTORATE FOR FINANCIAL AND EN-TERPRISE AFFAIRS, SouTH AFRICA: PHASE I REVIEW
OF LmPLEMENTATION OF THE CON-VENTION AND 1997 REVISED RECOMMENDATION 2(2008).
165. Id. at 10.
166. Id. at 11.
167. Id. at 25, citing Section 284(1) of the Companies Act of 1973 (South Africa).
168. Id. at 25, citing Section 286 of the Companies Act of 1973 (South Africa).
169. Id. at 26.
170. Id.
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tion of a legal duty or set of rules; or conduct designed to achieve an unjust result. This
ban would seem to be broader than the American FCPA. The South African PCCA re-
quires that the perpetrator act with intent; however, this requirement has been interpreted
to mean that where the accused is active in a field that is regulated, it is expected that the
accused would make necessary inquiries about applicable regulations before he acts. 17'
D. ESTONIA
Estonia acceded to the OECD Convention in November 2004 and implemented its
provisions in January 2005. To date, Estonia has no investigations or prosecutions of the
bribery of foreign public officials.
The Estonian penal code addresses bribery of foreign public officials through two sepa-
rate offenses. The first prohibits the giving of a gratuity to a public official to perform a
lawful act or an omission. 72 While gratuities violate U.S. domestic law 173, the payment of
gratuity that is not linked to a quid pro quo would not appear to violate the FCPA because
it is not a corrupt payment.
The other offense under Estonia law makes payment in exchange for an unlawful act or
omission the crime of bribery.' 74 Estonia's definition of a public official, however, is not
autonomous. A person is a public official for purposes of the statute only if he would be
considered an Estonian official if he worked for an equivalent body in Estonia.175 If there
is no equivalent body in Estonia, then a person is a foreign official only if he or she
performs public functions under the law of the foreign country. 176
Estonia provides for liability against legal persons for criminal offenses, including for-
eign bribes, only if the act is committed by management or senior level official of the legal
person.177
E. OTHER COUNTRIES
Argentina signed the OECD Convention in 1997 and in 1999 added a foreign bribery
offense in article 258.178 Since the establishment of the offense in 1999, however, there
have been no court decisions or prosecutions in relation to foreign bribery. Argentina
171. Id. at 5. (This is substantially similar to the intent requirement under the U.S. public welfare doctrine);
See, e.g. U.S. v. International Minerals & Chemical Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 560 (1971).
172. OECD DIRECTORATE FOR FINANCIAL AND ENTERPRISE AIFAIRS, ESTONIA: PHASE I REvIEw OF
LmPLEMENrATION OF THE CONVENTION AND 1997 REVISED RECOMMENDATION (citing Estonia Penal
Code § 297).
173. 18 U.S.C. § 201 (2000).
174. Id., citing Estonia Penal Code § 298.
175. Id., citing Estonia Penal Code § 288.
176. Id. at 35.
177. Id. at 40.
178. OECD DIRECTORATE FOR FINANCIAL AND ENTERPRISE AFFAIRS, ARGENTINA: PHASE H1 REPORT ON
THE APPLICATION OF THE CONVFN'TION ON COMBATING BRIBERY ON FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND
INFI-ERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS AND THE 1997 RECOMMENDATION ON COMBATING BRIBERY
IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 8 (2008).
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signed the UNCAC in 2003 and ratified it in 2006; 179 however, Argentina has not estab-
lished criminal liability of legal persons for bribery.1 80
In Switzerland in 2005 and 2006, twenty-three cases were initiated for bribery of for-
eign public officials, seventeen related to the Oil for Food Program.181 So far, there have
been eight prosecutions and convictions related to the Oil for Food program in which
seventeen million Swiss francs were confiscated.1s2 In December of 2003, a British-based
businessman was found by the Attorney General of Geneva to be guilty and fined for
laundering tens of millions of dollars in bribes for the then president of Nigeria. 83 The
bribes were found to have been paid by several companies, including Ferrostaal of Ger-
many and India's Tata. 8 4
It has been reported that nineteen investigations are under way in France concerning
payments of hundreds of millions of dollars in bribes to secure contracts in Asia and Latin
America between 1998 and 2003 by Alstom in connection with projects in those re-
gions.18s Two former Alstom representatives have allegedly been questioned by the
French police and confirmed that slush funds were used to pay commissions to win con-
tracts. 186 The funds were not recorded in Alstom's regular financial books and records. It
has been reported that between 1998 and 2001 an Alstom consultant in Brazil received
$1.4 million from a Swiss account.1 87
In 2005, Australia established a royal commission to investigate allegations that the Aus-
tralian Wheat Board had made payments of $220 million to secure contacts worth $2.3
billion under the UN's Oil for Food Program in Iraq. 18 8 The commission recommended
criminal sanctions against twelve persons including eleven executives.' 89
The 2008 Progress Report on Enforcement of the OECD Convention showed signifi-
cant enforcement by sixteen governments, but little or no enforcement by eighteen.19
France, Germany, and the United States seem to lead the way, with Japan and the United
Kingdom trailing the pack.' 9 1 The United Kingdom has failed to bring any bribery cases
and terminated a 2006 investigation into foreign bribery allegations against defense com-
pany BAE Systems on national security grounds, casting serious doubt on the govern-
ment's commitment to fighting corruption. 92 The matter has been ruled unlawful by the
U.K. High Court. The Serious Fraud Office has appealed to the House of Lords and a
decision is expected later this year.' 9 3
179. Id.
180. Id. at 38.
181. OECD DIRECTIORATE FOR FINANCIAL AND ENTERPRISE AFFAIRS, SWITZERLAND: PHASE 2 FOLLOW-
UP REPORT ON THE IPLEIMENTATION OF PHASE 2 RECOMMENDATIONS 21-22 (2007).
182. OECD Progress Report, supra note 152, at 34.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 21, 39.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 14.
189. Id.
190. OECD Progress Report, supra note 152.
191. Id. at 6.
192. Id. at 35.
193. TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, 2008 G8 PROGRESS REPORT 22 (2008).
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V. Compliance
Given the worldwide efforts by all Western governments to combat bribery of foreign
officials, what can a corporation do to insulate itself from potential liability? The answer
is the implementation and enforcement of an effective compliance program. Compliance
programs have three main benefits. First, the existence of a compliance program that is
supported by management tends to reduce the frequency of violations among senior level
personnel, and thus, when violations occur, they tend to be engaged in by lower level
employees of the organization. Under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, violations of law
authorized or condoned by senior level officials are normally dealt with more severely. 194
Second, a compliance program helps to detect problems while they are smaller and more
easily handled. Third, while a compliance program is not a defense to an FCPA viola-
tion, 195 the fact that a compliance program is enforced, monitored, and periodically au-
dited by high-level management employees may be persuasive to the government when
determining whether a violation by a low level employee warrants indictment, a deferred
prosecution agreement, a non-prosecution agreement, a civil enforcement action, or no
action at all.
A. POLICY STATEMENT
The essential first step of a compliance program is a clearly articulated policy that ap-
plies to all directors, officers, employees, agents, consultants, and business partners. A
program must also have a written code of conduct that defines what is prohibited and
explains how to identify and report violations.
In preparing the FCPA policy and code of conduct, the corporation should begin with a
statement that articulates the values, policies, and procedures that will be used to prevent
bribery. For example, the statement should begin with a broad statement indicating that
it is the policy of the company not to pay bribes in order to obtain or retain business and
that any officer, director, employee, or agent of the company who does so will be termi-
nated and reported to the appropriate government officials for prosecution. The policy
should be flexible enough to comply with all laws relevant to prohibiting bribery in all
jurisdictions in which the company does business. It must make clear that management
fully supports and is committed to this compliance program. It should then provide a
broad overview of the FCPA and define and give examples of key terms such as "foreign
officials" and "anything of value," and make clear that bribery in any form is prohibited.
It should address key areas such as gifts, political or charitable contributions, sponsorships,
commission payments, consulting payments, travel and entertainment, and facilitating
payments as well as provide examples of when such payments are not permissible. The
code of conduct should define the company's policy on gifts, defining to whom gifts may
or may not be given. It should specifically detail who may authorize political or charitable
contributions and detail the process for seeking such approval.
The compliance policy should also articulate the due diligence process that must be
undertaken before agents are hired by the corporation or the corporation enters into a
joint venture arrangement with a business partner. This process should include checking
194. U.S. SN-IENCING GUIDPLINES MANUAL § 8C2.5 (2007).
195. See generally United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1007 (9th Cir. 1972).
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with local counsel, the U.S. Embassy, publicly available databases, and news articles about
the agents or partners. It should also include periodic certifications from the agents and
the business partners that they have and will adhere to the FCPA. In the case of joint
ventures, the company should require that proper internal accounting controls are in place
for the joint venture and that the joint venture has accurate and detailed record keeping of
all transactions and dispositions of assets and should allow for withdrawal from the joint
venture arrangement if anti-bribery violations are uncovered. It is important to consider
that one's leverage is greatest before a deal is struck.
The policy should also describe the administration of the compliance program, includ-
ing who the chief compliance officer is, how often education and training of employees
will take place, what confirmations of compliance will be required by employees, and how
often those certifications should be made. The program should also clearly set forth the
company's enforcement mechanism, including how to report violations and the discipli-
nary process for those who allegedly have engaged in violations.
B. EDUCATION AND TRAININc
The program should be headed by a compliance officer who reports to the compliance
or audit committee of the board of directors. That compliance officer must ensure that all
directors, officers, employees, agents, and business partners are periodically trained on the
requirements of the program so that they are familiar with the policies, code of conduct,
and code of ethics of the corporation and are able to identify and report violations. Those
directors, officers, and employees should be required to provide annual certifications that
they have been trained in the program, have personally complied with the compliance
program, and have no knowledge of any violation of the FCPA. In fulfilling this process,
care must be exercised to ensure that the compliance culture is conveyed effectively to
foreign employees. For example, in China there are fifteen different definitions for "kick-
back;" however, none of them imply illegality.19
6
C. REPORThNG/DUE DILIGENCE
Any system of compliance must be reasonably designed, implemented, and enforced so
that it is generally effective in preventing and detecting criminal conduct. This means
there must be a system for reporting violations such as a help line and, when violations do
occur, a system of discipline for those directors, officers, employees, agents, etc., who
violate the corporation's policies, codes of conduct, and ethics.
A system of due diligence must be established as part of the compliance program. This
system must provide for pre-retention and post-retention oversight of all agents, vendors,
and business partners. It should also require representations and certifications of adher-
ence to the compliance program in all agreements with agents, vendors, and business part-
ners. Simply stating in an agreement that an agent, vendor, or business partner will
comply with all applicable laws is insufficient. Rather, the agreement must specify the
196. Several years ago, Mr. Razzano, one of the authors of this article, gave a talk to a group of Italian
magistrates. He made the point that a good prosecutor could indict a "ham sandwich." When the audience
looked at his with puzzlement, he realized that the translator had used the literal words "panini de prosciutto"
to convey the meaning.
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elements of the FCPA and that the agent, consultant, or joint venture partner certifies that
they have not violated any of these elements.
Moreover, agreements should require an independent internal audit of agents' and busi-
ness partners' books and records to insure that all internal control procedures of the com-
pany are adhered to and that the books and records accurately record the financial
transactions of the company. Restrictions should also be placed on assigning any contract.
Again, one's leverage is greatest at the outset of the relationship. If the business partners
will not agree, the company may walk away from the deal.
As part of the due diligence process, the corporation should utilize questionnaires to be
distributed among its agents, vendors, 'and joint venture partners in order to inquire about
relationships with foreign government officials and their qualifications. Following those
questionnaires, the agents and the business partners should be interviewed in order to
understand their financial and business qualifications. Database searches on the agents
and the business partners should commence. The fees that the agents charge should be
researched and opinions of local counsel should be obtained.
D. AUDITING
Periodically, the compliance system must be independently audited in order to evaluate
the corporation's FCPA knowledge and compliance. An audit of the program would in-
clude identifying high-risk areas and countries and accumulating electronic data and docu-
ments with respect to those high-risk areas. After accumulating the documents and
reviewing them, the auditor will want to conduct follow-up interviews during which any
unusual transactions should be selected for further review and on-site testing and follow-
up. The internal audit should then be reported to the compliance officer, audit commit-
tee, and corporate counsel. In conducting the review, special attention should be paid to
red flags such as one time payments to vendors who have not been pre-cleared, payments
in large round dollar amounts, the submission of sequential duplicative invoice numbers
from the same vendor, duplicate invoices that are paid twice, vendors with the same ad-
dress as an employee address, payments to countries where the company does no business,
payments to vendors with the same bank account as an employee, payments to politically
exposed persons, 197 and payments to invalid addresses or to P.O. boxes. These are just a
few examples. Any transaction that lacks transparency must be examined.
The audit should also involve the review of general ledgers in an attempt to identify
gifts, charitable and political contributions, unusual travel and expense items, abnormal
employee bonuses (which may have been used to pay bribes), entertainment expenses,
marketing expenses and commissions, as well as educational programs or seminars, which
may be used to disguise a payment to a foreign individual. Payments for health care for
foreign officials or their relatives, rebate sales promotions, and rents should be examined.
In conducting an audit of the program, particular attention should be paid to public an-
nouncements that competitors in the same industry are under investigation. As part of the
audit, the FCPA compliance program and code of conduct should be reviewed. Interviews
197. The term "politically exposed person" generally includes a current or former senior foreign political
figure, their immediate family, and their close associates. For related definitions and greater details, see
FEDERAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTiONS EXAMINATION COUNCIL, BANK SECRECY AcTr/ANnI-MONEY LAUN-
DERING EXAMINATION MANUAL (2008).
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should be conducted with the company's management to determine FCPA awareness and
the tone from the top.
When acquiring a corporation, it is essential that due diligence be applied in reviewing
the acquiree's FCPA compliance. Such review should determine whether the acquiree has
policies and procedures in place for FCPA compliance. Interviews with the acquiree's
management to assess compliance are also advised. Conducting tests focusing on certain
accounts, vendors, employees, agents and countries is appropriate, as well as the auditing
of employee expenses, agent commissions, consulting payments, and general ledger items,
such as gifts, promotional expenses, sales, marketing, and facilitating expenses. In con-
ducting such a review, compliance staff should look at one-time payments to consultants
and agents and undocumented cash transactions.
E. RESPONSE
In constructing an FCPA policy, the corporation should decide how it will respond to
allegations of FCPA violations by whistle-blowers or by the government. Response proto-
cols should detail document and computer control policies and email retention so that
when the corporation learns that there is a whistle-blower allegation or governmental
inquiry, there is a litigation hold put in place and suspension of the company's normal
document destruction policies.
F. ENFORCEMENT
Finally, when violations are found, the corporation must act swiftly to discipline offend-
ing employees, investigate to ensure that no other violations are or have taken place, re-
mediate any wrongdoing, and self-report.
VI. Conclusion
With the combination of the apparent extraterritorial reach of the FCPA, the increas-
ingly pervasive and global enforcement of foreign transnational anti-bribery laws, and the
demonstrated willingness of the United States and foreign governments to vigorously
prosecute both corporate and individual defendants, the costs of non-compliance has be-
come, quite simply, too costly. Like other areas of domestic and foreign corporate crimi-
nal law, the FCPA demands that companies develop and implement a comprehensive
FCPA compliance program, including on-going training of employees, monitoring of em-
ployee and institutional conduct, and swift corrective action to address uncovered
violations.
Recently, the Honorable Stanley Sporkin, in a November 2008 speech before the Euro-
pean American Chamber of Commerce in New York City, proposed a novel approach to
FCPA compliance. 198 He suggested an inoculation program for corporations doing busi-
ness overseas. Under this program, if a corporation voluntarily agreed to adopt a vigorous
FCPA compliance program, appoint a FCPA compliance officer, and undergo a three year
forensic audit aimed at identifying past FCPA violations, it would receive in return an
198. Stanley Sporkin, Remarks at the European American Chamber of Commerce entitled, "Managing Your
Risk of Doing Business Abroad by Complying with the FCPA" (Nov. 20, 2008).
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agreement by the government that it would not be prosecuted for a period of five years. 199
This program has real merit and should be seriously considered by the Department of
Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commission. Under current law, a corporation
can be held criminally liable for the acts of even low-level employees, despite the fact that
the employees' conduct was unauthorized and in violation of the company's compliance
program. Judge Sporkin's inoculation program would allow past violations by such em-
ployees to be uncovered by the corporation itself and require vigorous future enforcement
in return for five years of peace.
199. Id.
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